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
# INSPECTOR GENERAL

*U.S. Department of Defense*

SEPTEMBER 30, 2013



## DoD Is Not Properly Monitoring the Initiation of Maintenance for Facilities at Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan



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# Results in Brief

## *DoD Is Not Properly Monitoring the Initiation of Maintenance for Facilities at Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan*

September 30, 2013

### Objective

We determined whether DoD was properly monitoring the transition of newly constructed or remodeled facilities to the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) IV Density List at Kandahar Airfield (KAF), Afghanistan. For a facility to receive maintenance from the LOGCAP contractor, the facility must be added to the Density List.

### Finding

For the 23 facilities reviewed at KAF, valued at \$67.5 million, DoD did not properly monitor the transition of newly constructed or remodeled facilities to the LOGCAP IV Density List. Specifically, four facilities that were on the Density List (the Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration facilities; and the Command Central facility) required significant repairs and experienced deficiencies with critical fire detection and fire suppression systems.

In addition, 19 facilities had deficiencies that prevented them from being added to the Density List. Specifically, the Expeditionary Airlift Shelter and Cargo Handling Warehouse, both 98 percent complete, were not fully used by the Air Force. Also, the Air Force was using the facilities on the Yankee and Zulu Ramps, but the facilities were deteriorating while they waited to be added to the Density List.

These conditions occurred because the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Transatlantic Division did

### Finding Continued

not hold the construction contractors accountable for unsatisfactory performance. In addition, no official was ultimately held responsible for transitioning facilities to the Density List.

As a result, DoD was constructing facilities that the Regional Support Group at KAF was not able to effectively sustain, and 2 of the 23 facilities were not fully used due to construction deficiencies. Additionally, the fire suppression systems in 21 of the 23 facilities could not adequately suppress a fire, putting the life and safety of the occupants in jeopardy.

### Recommendations

The Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, should develop a working group with representatives from applicable DoD organizations to establish a process that verifies that facilities are constructed to acceptable standards and transitioned to the Density List in a timely manner. In addition, the commander should expedite repairs to the fire suppression systems at KAF. The Commander, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Transatlantic Division, should review the performance of the officials who approved the fire suppression systems that are not operational, as appropriate, and initiate corrective measures and actions to hold personnel accountable.

### Management Comments

The Commanding General, U.S. National Support Element Command-Afghanistan, responding for the Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, comments were responsive. The Deputy Director of Logistics/Engineering, U.S. Central Command, responding for the Commander, U.S. Central Command, comments were partially responsive. We redirected our recommendation to the Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan and request comments by October 30, 2013. Please see the Recommendations Table on the back of this page. The Deputy Commander, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Transatlantic Division comments were responsive.

### ***Recommendations Table***

Management	Recommendations Requiring Comment	No Additional Comments Required
Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan	2	1
Commander, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Transatlantic Division		3, 4

\*Please provide comments by October 30, 2013.



**INSPECTOR GENERAL  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE  
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500**

September 30, 2013

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND  
COMMANDER, U.S. FORCES-AFGHANISTAN  
AUDITOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT: DoD Is Not Properly Monitoring the Initiation of Maintenance for Facilities  
at Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan (Report No. DODIG-2013-137)

We are providing this report for your review and comment. For the 23 facilities reviewed at Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan, valued at \$67.5 million, DoD did not properly monitor the transition of newly constructed or remodeled facilities to the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program IV Density List. Sustainment of facilities after construction is critical because it enables DoD to effectively accomplish mission requirements and enhance the safety of personnel in Afghanistan.

We considered management comments on a draft of this report when preparing the final report. DoD Directive 7650.3 requires that recommendations be resolved promptly. The DoD Directive 7650.3 requires that recommendations be resolved promptly. The Commanding General, U.S. National Support Element Command-Afghanistan comments for Recommendation 1, responding for the Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, were responsive and no further comments are needed. The Deputy Director of Logistics/Engineering, U.S. Central Command comments for Recommendation 2, responding for the Commander, U.S. Central Command, were partially responsive. We redirected Recommendation 2 to the Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan and request comments to this recommendation by October 30, 2013. The Deputy Commander, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Transatlantic Division comments for Recommendations 3 and 4 were responsive and no further comments are needed.

Please send a PDF file containing your comments to [audrco@dodig.mil](mailto:audrco@dodig.mil). Copies of your comments must have the actual signature of the authorizing official for your organization. We cannot accept the /Signed/ symbol in place of the actual signature. If you arrange to send classified comments electronically, you must send them over the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET).

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. Please direct questions to me at (703) 604-8905 (DSN 664-8905). If you desire, we will provide a formal briefing on the results.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, reading "Daniel R. Blair".

Daniel R. Blair  
Deputy Inspector General  
for Auditing

## Contents

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### Introduction

Objective	1
Background	1
Review of Internal Controls	5

### **Finding. Accountability Needed for Effective Transition of Facilities to the Density List at Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan**

Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration Facilities Were Poorly Constructed Before They Were Added to the Density List	7
Command Central Facility Had Multiple Construction Problems	11
Expeditionary Airlift Shelter and Cargo Handling Warehouse Were Not Fully Used and Await Addition to the Density List	15
Yankee and Zulu Ramps Were Deteriorating as They Waited for Addition to the Density List	17
Improved Oversight Needed for Transitioning Facilities to the Density List	20
DoD Did Not Effectively Sustain Facilities	21
Management Comments on the Finding and Our Response	22
Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response	23

### Appendix

Scope and Methodology	27
Use of Computer-Processed Data	28
Use of Technical Assistance	28
Prior Coverage	28

### Management Comments

United States Central Command	29
United States Forces-Afghanistan	30
United States Army Corps of Engineers	32

### Acronyms and Abbreviations

# Introduction

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## Objective

Our objective was to determine whether DoD was properly monitoring the transition of newly constructed or remodeled facilities to the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) IV Density List at Kandahar Airfield (KAF), Afghanistan. Specifically, we examined facilities on the Density List to determine the repair costs they incurred before they were added to the list. Additionally, we examined facilities at KAF that were not on the Density List to determine the obstacles that prevented their placement on the list for long-term maintenance. See the appendix for a discussion of the audit scope and methodology.

## Background

Military installations in Afghanistan, such as KAF, may use the LOGCAP contractor<sup>1</sup> to maintain their facilities. The LOGCAP contractor provides base maintenance, refurbishment, fire prevention services, plumbing, cleaning, power generation, and vector control. The contract and task orders contain terms and conditions intended to allow personnel to respond rapidly to dynamic conditions and emerging battlefield logistics requirements in Afghanistan.

A facility must be listed on the Density List before it can receive maintenance from the LOGCAP contractor. As of March 15, 2013, the Density List at KAF consisted of 6,511 facilities<sup>2</sup> with a total of 3.5 million square feet. Additionally, there were 103 facilities at KAF waiting to be added to the Density List. The LOGCAP contractor is not authorized to work on facilities that are not on the Density List; this includes routine maintenance, repairs, and new construction.

## *Roles and Responsibilities*

Multiple DoD Components have important roles and responsibilities for facilities' life cycle at KAF that range from contract oversight during construction to the maintenance of those facilities after they are built.

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<sup>1</sup> The Rock Island Contracting Center for U.S. Army Sustainment Command awarded contract number W52P1J-07-D-0007, Task Order 0004 to DynCorp International, headquartered in Falls Church, Virginia, on July 7, 2009, a cost-plus-award-fee contract, currently valued at \$5.4 billion, as of April 10, 2013. The contract may continue to July 2015 and require additional funding. This contract is for services in southern Afghanistan (KAF is located in the south region).

<sup>2</sup> Types of facilities include warehouses, tents, latrines, office buildings, and living quarters.

### *Regional Support Group at Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan*

The Regional Support Group (RSG) provides direct support to the Commander, KAF, for Base Operating Support-Integrator responsibilities. These responsibilities include coordination of contracting support; master planning for facilities and real estate; collection and prioritization of construction requirements; environmental management; and hazardous waste management. The RSG is responsible for property accountability for facilities at KAF.

### *U.S. Army Corps of Engineers*

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Transatlantic Division (USACE-TAD) executes construction and engineering operations throughout Afghanistan. For constructing facilities at KAF, USACE-TAD personnel award and administer contracts in support of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A). After a construction project is completed by the contractor and accepted by USACE-TAD, the new facility is transferred to a DoD Component that will use it.

### *Defense Contract Management Agency*

The Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) administers the LOGCAP contract at KAF, as delegated by the U.S. Army Sustainment Command, and provides oversight through its quality assurance representatives. Additionally, DCMA evaluates the LOGCAP contractor's performance and issues letters of technical direction, which direct the contractor to complete a technical inspection. DCMA officers coordinate with USACE-TAD on the technical inspection report and provide copies of the report to the applicable Government representative. DCMA personnel coordinate with USACE-TAD personnel to resolve any construction deficiencies identified in the technical inspection.

### *Task Force Protect Our Warfighter and Electrical Resources*

Task Force Protect Our Warfighter and Electrical Resources (TF POWER) is a program established by USFOR-A to inspect electrical and fire safety throughout Afghanistan. Every facility in Afghanistan used by DoD personnel and DoD contractors is inspected for both electrical and fire safety by TF POWER personnel or by their contractor. TF POWER can assist with adding facilities to the Density List by facilitating repairs, interpreting electrical code, and issuing rulings to solve disputes.

## ***Process for Transitioning Facilities to the Density List***

A DoD Component can submit a request to the RSG at KAF to be added to the Density List for the LOGCAP contractor to provide maintenance for its facility. Then DCMA, the Administrative Contracting Office, issues a letter of technical direction to the LOGCAP contractor directing them to perform technical inspections on the DoD Component's facility. Before a facility is added to the Density List, it must be technically inspected by the LOGCAP contractor and brought up to acceptable (safe) standards. The LOGCAP contractor conducts technical inspections in many areas: electrical; plumbing; fire prevention; carpentry; and heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC). After the technical inspection, the LOGCAP contractor provides a written statement detailing all the deficiencies in the facility. The LOGCAP contractor will not accept the facility onto the Density List until the deficiencies are resolved. If the facility requires repairs, which is common, the DoD Component can resolve the deficiencies using the following methods: (1) original construction contractor corrects the deficiencies; (2) troop labor; (3) waivers from applicable authority;<sup>3</sup> (4) a new contract to correct the deficiencies; or (5) the LOGCAP contractor may correct the deficiencies at an additional cost. If the DoD Component requests that the LOGCAP contractor perform the repairs, DCMA will issue a change order detailing the necessary work.

## ***Facilities Reviewed***

We reviewed 4 contracts at KAF that resulted in the construction of 23 facilities, valued at \$67.5 million. USACE-TAD awarded the four contracts and oversaw the construction project's quality assurance. The following bullets identify the purposes of the facilities and provide brief descriptions of the contracts:

- The Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (RSOI) facilities consist of three 2-story barracks measuring a combined 45,084 square feet. Each building was designed to house 1,000 occupants on cots. USACE-TAD awarded the contract to Metag Insaat Ticaret A.S. from Ankara, Turkey on February 9, 2009. The contract type is firm-fixed-price, valued at \$12.1 million. The original contract completion date was February 19, 2010; however, the RSG at KAF did not accept the facilities until January 4, 2011. The three RSOI facilities were added to the Density List on the following dates: March 30, 2012 (Building 3); October 17, 2012 (Building 1); and November 12, 2012 (Building 2).<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup> TF POWER may waive electrical deficiencies the LOGCAP contractor identifies in its technical inspections.

<sup>4</sup> The LOGCAP contractor accepted the RSOI facilities on the Density list but rejected providing maintenance on the fire suppression system.

- The Command Central facility was built to support an Army Division Headquarters. The facility is 58,580 square feet and can hold about 500 personnel. The facility has administrative areas, latrines, communication distribution, water and sewage distribution systems, and mechanical systems. USACE-TAD awarded the contract to Emta Nsaat Ticaret A.S. from Ankara, Turkey on September 17, 2009. The contract type is firm-fixed-price, valued at \$12.3 million. The original contract completion date was August 13, 2010; however, the facility was not accepted by the RSG at KAF until November 1, 2011. The facility was added to the Density List on October 31, 2011.<sup>5</sup>
- The Expeditionary Airlift Shelter and the Cargo Handling Warehouse allow personnel to conduct field maintenance and fuel cell maintenance on deployed aircraft and create an expansion to an existing cargo handling area for both inbound and outbound cargo processing, respectively. USACE-TAD awarded the contract to Yenigun Insaat Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S. from Ankara, Turkey on February 14, 2011. The contract type is firm-fixed-price, valued at \$13 million. The original contract completion date was December 25, 2011; however, the Expeditionary Airlift Shelter was not accepted by the Air Force as of March 22, 2013, and the Cargo Handling Warehouse was partially accepted by the Air Force on February 4, 2013. The Shelter and Warehouse were not added to the Density List as of March 15, 2013.
- The Yankee and Zulu Ramps consist of Air Force expeditionary fighter shelters, aviation operations, maintenance facilities, and apron expansions, for a total of 17 facilities. USACE-TAD awarded the contract to CH2M Hill Constructors<sup>6</sup> from Chantilly, Virginia, on September 30, 2010. The contract type is firm-fixed-price, valued at \$30.1 million. The original contract completion date was July 30, 2011; however, U.S. Air Forces Central Command accepted the facilities on various dates from October 5, 2011, to May 11, 2012. The facilities on the Yankee and Zulu Ramps were not added to the Density List as of March 15, 2013.

<sup>5</sup> The LOGCAP contractor accepted the Command Central facility on the Density list; however, the LOGCAP contractor rejected providing maintenance on the fire suppression system.

<sup>6</sup> The LOGCAP contractor, DynCorp International, and CH2M Hill are business partners. CH2M Hill used (b) (4) as a subcontractor.

## Review of Internal Controls

DoD Instruction 5010.40, "Managers' Internal Control Program (MICP) Procedures," July 29, 2010, requires DoD organizations to implement a comprehensive system of internal controls that provides reasonable assurance that programs are operating as intended and to evaluate the effectiveness of the controls. We identified internal control weaknesses at the USACE-TAD contracting office. Specifically, USACE-TAD did not hold the construction contractors accountable, as required by the contract, for performance that did not meet the required acceptable standards of quality.<sup>7</sup> In addition, there was a lack of coordination among multiple DoD Components that held no official ultimately responsible for transitioning facilities to the Density List at KAF. We will provide a copy of the report to the senior official(s) responsible for internal controls at U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), USFOR-A, and USACE-TAD.

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<sup>7</sup> Acceptable standards of quality means the facilities must meet construction regulations. For instance, the construction contract for the Command Central facility states, "All work shall be in accordance with accepted standards of quality." The contract lists several specific regulations, such as, Unified Facilities Criteria, United States' National Fire Protection Association, and National Electrical Code.

## Finding

### Accountability Needed for Effective Transition of Facilities to the Density List at Kandahar

For the 23 facilities reviewed at KAF, valued at \$67.5 million, DoD did not properly monitor the transition of new or remodeled facilities from the construction phase to the LOGCAP IV Density List for ongoing maintenance and sustainment.

Specifically, four facilities that were partially on the Density List required significant repairs and experienced deficiencies with critical systems:

- ~~(FOUO)~~ The RSOI facilities (three facilities, valued at \$12.1 million) received an estimated \$5.6 million in repairs before the LOGCAP contractor added them to the Density List. Additionally, the fire detection system and fire suppression system were not operational.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ The Command Central facility (one facility, valued at \$12.3 million) required HVAC system repairs by the LOGCAP contractor after the facility was added to the Density List. Additionally, the fire detection system and the fire suppression system were not operational.

In addition, 19 facilities had deficiencies that prevented them from being added to the Density List:

- As of March 2013, the Expeditionary Airlift Shelter and Cargo Handling Warehouse (two facilities, valued at \$13.0 million), both 98 percent complete, were not fully used by the Air Force. Additionally, the Air Force had been waiting for both facilities to be added to the Density List since August 2012 and September 2012, respectively.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ The Air Force was using the facilities on the Yankee and Zulu Ramps (17 facilities, valued at \$30.1 million), but the facilities were deteriorating while they waited to be added to the Density List. Additionally, the fire suppression system was inoperable.

These conditions occurred because USACE-TAD did not hold the construction contractors accountable, as required by the contract, for performance that did not meet the required acceptable standards of quality. In addition, there was a lack of coordination among multiple organizations that held no official ultimately responsible for transitioning

facilities to the Density List at KAF. As a result, DoD was constructing facilities that the RSG was not able to effectively sustain, and 2 of the 23 facilities were not fully used due to construction deficiencies. Additionally, the fire suppression systems in 21 of the 23 facilities could not adequately suppress a fire, putting the life and safety of the occupants in jeopardy.<sup>8</sup>

## Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration Facilities Were Poorly Constructed Before They Were Added to the Density List

~~(FOUO)~~ In 2012, the RSOI facilities, which cost about \$12.1 million to construct, required repairs that cost an estimated \$5.6 million, or 46 percent of the construction cost, before they could be added to the Density List. The RSOI facilities (see Figure 1) had construction deficiencies that required repairs from the LOGCAP contractor and a TF POWER contractor before they could be added to the Density List. Additionally, the fire suppression system and fire detection system did not meet fire code requirements, and both were inoperable, as of January 7, 2013. Although LOGCAP contractor personnel added the RSOI facilities to the Density List in 2012, they did not accept the fire suppression system and fire detection system.

The RSOI facilities...required repairs that cost an estimated \$5.6 million, or 46 percent of the construction cost, before they could be added to the Density List.




Figure 1. RSOI Facilities.  
Source: DoD OIG

<sup>8</sup> The RSG at KAF was aware that the RSOI facilities' fire detection system and fire suppression system were not operational before the audit was announced. On December 23, 2012, the Command Central occupants were made aware that the fire detection system and the fire suppression system were not operational. The Air Force was aware, before the audit was announced, that the fire suppression system for the facilities at the Yankee and Zulu Ramps were inoperable.

### ***Facilities Required Millions of Dollars in Repairs Before They Could Be Added to the Density List***

The RSOI facilities required an estimated \$5.6 million in repairs before they could be added to the Density List: \$3.2 million for repairs performed by the LOGCAP contractor and \$2.4 million in electrical repairs performed by a TF POWER contractor. When U.S. military personnel initially occupied the RSOI facilities in 2009, the facilities were not added to the Density List. During the year the facilities were occupied, they deteriorated significantly. The personnel were later evacuated due to electrical deficiencies that posed a safety threat (U.S. military personnel occupied the RSOI facilities off and on from 2009 to 2012).

The Army and DCMA did not have adequate controls in place to properly monitor the repair costs that were billed by the LOGCAP contractor for work performed to add facilities to the Density List. On January 14, 2012, DCMA directed the LOGCAP contractor to provide all labor, materials, tools, equipment, transportation, and supervision necessary to repair all plumbing, electrical, and HVAC deficiencies required for RSOI facilities to meet inhabitable standards for U.S. forces and added to the Density List.

We requested the amount billed to DoD for the LOGCAP contractor's repair work on the RSOI facilities from the LOGCAP contractor. On January 2, 2013, the LOGCAP contractor's compliance office provided the following response:

We are unable to provide the vouchers showing costs billed for the change orders on the RSOI buildings. This is because individual vouchers were not prepared for those change orders. The costs were billed on our biweekly LOGCAP billings. LOGCAP bills the [U.S. Government] biweekly for all costs that are in our accounting system. This includes labor and [Other Direct Costs]. We are not required to do change order accounting on LOGCAP. We bill all detail charges at the task order and option year level. There is nothing notated on the invoices to the [U.S. Government] that reference the change orders.

The change orders for the repairs to the RSOI facilities were funded with \$3.2 million through the RSG at KAF. However, we could not verify the exact amount billed for the repairs to the RSOI facilities by the LOGCAP contractor. For instance, on February 6, 2013, the LOGCAP contractor invoiced DoD for \$49.4 million for performance period January 22, 2013, to February 4, 2013. The invoice was not itemized to detail the change orders as the LOGCAP contractor informed us. The payment voucher documents that DCMA was the service approver and the Defense Contract Audit Agency provisionally approved the payment. On November 24, 2012, we interviewed the

Commander, DCMA-Southern Afghanistan, and he stated that his staff had no knowledge of how to trace the money attached to a change order.

In addition, in June 2012, TF POWER reviewed the entire facility's electrical system and found the external feeder cables, interior wiring, electrical panels, raceways, and electrical devices consisted of nonlisted materials. The electrical system, from the power house through the entire RSOI facilities, did not meet standards and was deemed unsafe. Therefore, on July 30, 2012, TF POWER used the USACE-Philadelphia District to contract the electrical repairs to Inglett & Stubbs International, which cost \$2.4 million, according to the Deputy Director, TF POWER.

### ***Fire Suppression System and Fire Detection System Were Not Operational***

(FOUO) The fire suppression system and fire detection system in the RSOI facilities did not meet fire code requirements, and both were inoperable. USACE-TAD paid the construction contractor \$<sup>USACE: (b) (4)</sup> for the design and installation of a fire sprinkler system during the initial construction of the RSOI facilities. The construction contract to build the RSOI facilities states:

**3.3 Life Safety/Fire Protection/Handicapped Accessibility** - All facilities will be designed in accordance with recognized industry standards for life safety and building egress and will satisfy the requirements of NFPA 101, [Unified Facilities Criteria] 3-600-01, and The International Building Code. Compliant manual and automatic fire alarm and notification systems, portable fire extinguishers, fire sprinkler systems, and exiting facilities shall all be included when and as required.


(FOUO) According to the USACE-TAD deficiencies log for the RSOI facilities, the USACE-TAD quality assurance official documented that the construction contractor repaired the fire detection and fire suppression systems on August 22, 2009. However, on March 24, 2010, the Chief Fire Inspector, KAF Fire Department, documented that the fire detection system did not function properly and could not give a letter of acceptance. On April 21, 2010, the Chief Fire Inspector signed a memorandum documenting a partial acceptance of the RSOI facilities that stated:

These buildings have been a true challenge over the last 3 months with life safety problems. As stated in [National Fire Protection Association] 5000 each building is to have a separate zone. The [Fire Crash and Rescue Services] cannot [accept] this building's fire alarm system at this time. It is recommend that the fire alarm system meet the code requirement, or disconnect all smoke detectors and install hard wire smoke detector

with local alarm[.] However[,] the pull stations must remain operational and control each building as a separated unit. Once the sprinkler system is operational, this will assist in protecting the building occupants. This is a partial acceptance only.

~~(FOUO)~~ On July 29, 2011, the LOGCAP contractor conducted a technical inspection of the RSOI facilities compliance with fire safety regulations. The LOGCAP contractor inspectors identified 506 fire safety deficiencies. Specifically, the LOGCAP contractor inspectors identified improper sprinkler head spacing, improper smoke detector spacing, and an inadequate number of fire extinguishers.

~~(FOUO)~~ In May 2012, DoD OIG Technical Assessment Directorate engineers performed an inspection of the fire protection system at the RSOI facilities and identified major deficiencies which significantly increased the risk to life and safety. These deficiencies included a required automatic fire sprinkler system that was not operational, a fire department connection that was obstructed, and a fire detection system that was out of service. The technical assessment directorate engineers concluded that the inoperative fire sprinkler system and fire detection system provided a false sense of security and posed significant life, health, and safety risks to building occupants. On May 21, 2012, the engineers briefed the RSG at KAF about the RSOI facilities' inoperative fire automatic sprinkler system and fire detection system.



Engineers concluded that the inoperative system provided a false sense of security and posed significant life, health, and safety risks to building occupants.

~~(FOUO)~~ On August 26, 2012, the LOGCAP contractor performed a technical inspection on the RSOI facilities, which resulted in a rejection of the fire system to the Density List. The LOGCAP contractor inspectors noted that the fire department connection was blocked by the air conditioning unit at all the facilities and the inspectors noted that there were no test records of the fire alarm system at the premises. When DCMA directed the LOGCAP contractor to perform the estimated \$3.2 million change order to repair the RSOI facilities, DCMA did not require the LOGCAP contractor to repair or replace the fire suppression and detection systems. Nevertheless, the LOGCAP contractor added the RSOI facilities to the Density List in 2012.

~~(FOUO)~~ On January 19, 2013, the Deputy Director, TF POWER, informed us that he believed the fire suppression system of the RSOI facilities had never been operational. As a mitigation measure, the RSG at KAF directed units occupying the facilities to set up a 24/7 fire watch. Also, the deputy director stated:

At this stage in the game, we do not feel the fire suppression system warrants the hundreds of thousands of dollars to repair, so we plan to request a waiver for the requirement [from USCENTCOM], along with many other deficiencies identified base-wide by the fire & electrical DoDIG visit last summer.

~~(FOUO)~~ USFOR-A should expedite repairs to the fire suppression system at the RSOI facilities. Additionally, USACE-TAD should review the actions of the official(s) that conducted contract oversight and approved the inoperative fire suppression system and fire detection system at the RSOI facilities; and, as appropriate, initiate corrective measures and actions to hold personnel accountable.

## Command Central Facility Had Multiple Construction Problems

~~(FOUO)~~ The Command Central facility (one facility, valued at \$12.3 million) had repairs on the HVAC system by the LOGCAP contractor after addition to the Density List, and the fire detection system and the fire suppression system were not operational, as of January 12, 2013. The Command Central facility required repairs often from the LOGCAP contractor because of the facility's poor construction, according to the tenants. Even though LOGCAP contractor personnel accepted the Command Central facility on the Density List in 2011, they did not accept the fire suppression system and fire detection system.

### *HVAC System at Command Central Facility Was Repaired After Facility Was Added to the Density List*

On October 31, 2011, the Command Central facility was added to the Density List without the required repairs; however, the facility would receive repairs later in 2012. The facility was not occupied until the 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Division deployed to KAF in July 2012 (see Figure 2). After the facility was occupied, tenants experienced chronic HVAC system deficiencies due to poor quality construction by the USACE-TAD construction contractor.



During the summer of 2012, the HVAC system was not cooling sections of the facility. Command Central officials stated that the facility was usually 100 to 120 degrees inside during the summer, and the temperature of the commanding general's office was higher than the outside temperature.<sup>9</sup> Therefore, on July 10, 2012, the tenants contacted the LOGCAP contractor to repair the Command Central facility's HVAC system, but contractor personnel provided only a temporary repair.

On July 26, 2012, USACE-TAD assessed the HVAC system and identified that the compressors were unworkable; USACE-TAD contacted the construction contractor to make the necessary repairs under warranty. The USACE-TAD construction contractor did not repair the HVAC units. On October 17, 2012, the USACE-TAD contracting officer signed a memorandum stating:

The repair and or replacement of the HVAC at the [Command Central] building cannot be done under warranty because the warranty was voided by the local maintenance firm (DynCorp) making unauthorized repairs on the [air-handling units] and failing to perform regular maintenance. The system cannot be warranted by the manufacturer without replacement of the existing components. USACE cannot direct the construction contractor to affect any further repairs or inspections without having a new contract in place because the system is not under warranty.

Personnel in the 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Division who were responsible for the Command Central facility stated that after the manufacturer's warranty expired, the LOGCAP contractor sent in teams that fully repaired the HVAC system. The Command Central facility officials stated that the USACE-TAD construction contractor used unskilled labor and substandard materials, and that these personnel were not able to repair the HVAC system. A Command Central official stated that personnel in the facility "paid with a lot of sweat," and DoD should get its money back from the USACE-TAD construction contractor.

We requested from DCMA the amount billed to DoD for the LOGCAP contractor's repairs on the Command Central facility's HVAC system. The LOGCAP contractor compliance office provided a written statement explaining that the exact costs are not available for the repairs performed on the Command Central's HVAC system during the fall of 2012. However, they estimated the repairs to cost about \$50,000 for parts and labor. The LOGCAP contractor provided supporting documentation detailing 40 service orders performed from August 2012 to December 2012. For example, on October 19, 2012, the LOGCAP contractor began replacing the compressors, replacing air filters, repairing

<sup>9</sup> KAF averages a high of 104 degrees in July.

leaks, and recharging the units. Additionally, LOGCAP contractor personnel provided supporting documents that detail they conducted maintenance on the HVAC system, mostly in April 2012, before the 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Division occupied the facility.

### ***Command Central's Fire Protection Systems Were Not Operational***

~~(FOUO)~~ The fire detection system and the fire suppression system in the Command Central facility were not operational. On October 28, 2011, the LOGCAP contractor performed a technical inspection on the Command Central facility and identified several fire safety deficiencies. The LOGCAP contractor's technical inspection identified that there were no test records of the fire detection system and that it did not appear to meet standards. Additionally, the LOGCAP contractor's inspector noted that he was unable to walk through the entire facility because USACE-TAD personnel rushed him through. Consequently, the LOGCAP contractor rejected the fire protection system from inclusion on the Density List, even though the facility was added to the Density List on October 31, 2011.

~~(FOUO)~~ On June 27, 2012, the LOGCAP contractor fire inspectors reviewed the Command Central facility and noted several fire deficiencies. The LOGCAP contractor's fire inspectors identified that the facility did not have enough smoke detectors, and if the fire alarm goes off, the security system will lock the doors and impede exit and entry into the facility. After the inspection, the LOGCAP contractor installed single station battery-operated smoke detectors in the facility.

~~(FOUO)~~ On a December 23, 2012, visit to the Command Central facility to verify the problems reported by the LOGCAP contractor, a DCMA fire subject matter expert found that the fire detection system and fire suppression system were not operational. Figure 3 shows the poor condition of the water pump used for the fire suppression system at the Command Central facility. Specifically, when the fire alarm was pulled, nothing happened. In addition, the interior doors appeared to have had their locking mechanisms removed, which would prevent the doors from locking unexpectedly upon alarm activation. The tenants did not know that the fire detection system and fire suppression system did not work; therefore, the DCMA official instructed the facility managers to change their standing operating procedures and notify the occupants.



Figure 3. Water Pump Used for the Fire Suppression System at Command Central.  
Source: DoD OIG

~~(FOUO)~~ Upon identification of the inoperative fire detection system, the USFOR-A Theater Deputy Fire Chief stationed at KAF was notified and called for a systems review and input. He confirmed that the fire detection system and fire suppression system were out of service in the Command Central facility. On January 3, 2013, the USFOR-A Deputy Fire Chief informed us that the fire detection system in the Command Central facility did not work because the USACE-TAD construction contractor did not install the fire detection system correctly. The USACE-TAD construction contractor exchanged a wireless transceiver control unit, purportedly connected to the fire detection system that they purchased from Monaco Enterprises Inc. This equipment's intended use is to transmit a wireless signal to the fire department in the event of a fire alarm activation; however, the receiving equipment for the signal does not exist on KAF. In addition, the transceiver equipment contained a manufacturer's ID label on the inside of the panel dated January 2011, but after examination by the USFOR-A Deputy Fire Chief, it was determined to be a device, manufactured in 1996, that was removed from a base in Incirlic, Turkey due to noncompliance with existing NFPA and DoD standards. Many of the wires were not connected to the fire control panel and the fire control system was not operational. The fire detection panel did not show that there were any errors in the fire control system and its indicator light showed that the fire control system was working properly. However, when the USFOR-A Deputy Fire Chief tested the pull stations and installed detectors, it was determined that no connectivity existed with the fire detection panel other than the mass notification device that was interconnected to the fire detection panel. The replacement cost for the fire suppression system at the Command Central facility was unknown according to the USFOR-A Deputy Fire Chief.

The construction contract for the Command Central facility specifically required an automatic sprinkler system and a detection system built to code.<sup>10</sup> The contract did not specify the amount contracted for the construction of the sprinkler system or the fire detection system. The USFOR-A Deputy Fire Chief provided documentation showing that on October 22, 2011, the USACE-TAD project engineer approved the fire suppression system at the Command Central facility. In addition, on October 26, 2011, the Chief of the Fire and Crash Rescue Department at KAF approved the Command Central facility fit for occupancy. USACE personnel stated that the fire detection and suppression systems worked when they inspected the systems on October 22, 2011, which were also witnessed by a TF POWER fire inspector. USACE personnel stated they did not know who compromised the fire control system after their inspection.

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<sup>10</sup> Contract requires construction as dictated by the United Facilities Criteria.

~~(FOUO)~~ On January 16, 2013, the Director, TF POWER, stated that TF POWER planned to repair the fire suppression system and the fire detection system at the Command Central facility. USFOR-A should expedite repairs to the fire suppression system and the fire detection system at the Command Central facility. Additionally, USACE-TAD should review the actions of the official(s) that conducted contract oversight and approved the inoperative fire suppression system and fire detection system at the Command Central facility; and, as appropriate, initiate corrective measures and actions to hold personnel accountable.

### **Expeditionary Airlift Shelter and Cargo Handling Warehouse Were Not Fully Used and Await Addition to the Density List**

As of March 2013, the Expeditionary Airlift Shelter and Cargo Handling Warehouse (2 facilities, valued at \$13.0 million), both 98 percent complete, were not fully used by the Air Force, had been waiting to be added to the Density List since August 2012 and September 2012, respectively. The Air Force requested that these facilities be added to the Density List, but the LOGCAP contractor denied the request because the facilities had building code deficiencies in the electrical and HVAC systems.

On January 4, 2013, a 451<sup>st</sup> Expeditionary Civil Engineer Squadron (ECES) official stated that before the Air Force could accept the facilities from USACE-TAD, the LOGCAP contractor must approve the facilities for addition to the Density List. However, the Air Force did not want to pay the LOGCAP contractor to bring the facilities up to acceptable standards of quality. Instead, the Air Force waited for the USACE-TAD construction contractor to repair all the deficiencies identified by the LOGCAP contractor. According to the USACE-TAD contractor performance evaluation dated December 2012, the contractor had been USACE: (b) (5) for both facilities. USACE had not fully paid the contractor for the facilities because they were waiting for the construction contractor to fix the deficiencies identified from the LOGCAP contractor's inspections. USACE-TAD should hold the contractor accountable for not constructing the facilities to acceptable standards of quality and require the contractor to bring the facilities up to acceptable standards of quality, in order to add the facilities to the Density List.

### ***Expeditionary Airlift Shelter Was Not Added to the Density List***

The LOGCAP contractor rejected the Expeditionary Airlift Shelter (see Figure 4) from inclusion on the Density List because they identified construction deficiencies in the electrical and HVAC system. The LOGCAP contractor performed two technical inspections on the Expeditionary Airlift Shelter in August and October 2012, which identified electrical deficiencies, such as an unapproved conduit method for primary and secondary transformers, improperly protected grounding electrode conductors, and two grounds terminated under a lug designed for one. HVAC deficiencies included two large units that were not operational, an absent fire damper, and the wall penetration was not rodent proofed. The LOGCAP contractor requested correction to these construction deficiencies before adding the Expeditionary Airlift Shelter to the Density List. As of March 22, 2013, the Air Force was not using the Expeditionary Airlift Shelter because it would not accept the facility until it was added to the Density List.



Figure 4. Expeditionary Airlift Shelter.  
Source: DoD OIG

### ***Cargo Handling Warehouse Was Not Added to the Density List***

LOGCAP contractor personnel also rejected the Cargo Handling Warehouse from inclusion on the Density List because they identified construction deficiencies with its electrical and HVAC systems. The LOGCAP contractor performed two technical inspections in September and November 2012 and identified that electrical panels did not have proper working clearances, individual conductors were too small for the cable trays, and the conductors in the cable tray inside the fire pump house needed to be derated. In addition, the LOGCAP contractor identified that the HVAC unit was inoperable and had safety hazards. The LOGCAP contractor requested correction to these construction deficiencies before adding the Cargo Handling Warehouse to the Density List. On January 4, 2013, we conducted a walkthrough of the vacant warehouse before the

facility was accepted by the Air Force (see Figure 5). On February 4, 2013, the Air Force partially accepted the Cargo Handling Warehouse from USACE-TAD because of mission needs. The Air Force uses the warehouse only for temporary storage, according to a 451<sup>st</sup> ECES official. However, on March 22, 2013, we visited the warehouse and it was empty.



Figure 5. Inside the Cargo Handling Warehouse.  
Source: DoD OIG

## **Yankee and Zulu Ramps Were Deteriorating as They Waited for Addition to the Density List**

The Air Force was using the Yankee and Zulu Ramp facilities, but the facilities were deteriorating while they waited to be added to the Density List. Additionally, the fire suppression system for the Yankee and Zulu Ramps was inoperable. LOGCAP contractor personnel rejected the facilities because of construction deficiencies that required repair before the facilities could be added to the Density List.

### ***Facilities on the Yankee and Zulu Ramps Need Repairs***

~~(FOUO)~~ After the Air Force accepted the Yankee and Zulu Ramp facilities from USACE-TAD, it identified systemic structural deficiencies in six of the facilities. During 2011 and 2012, the LOGCAP contractor conducted technical inspections on the facilities on the Yankee and Zulu Ramps and identified numerous construction deficiencies in HVAC, electrical, carpentry, and fire protection. Therefore, the LOGCAP contractor did not add the facilities on the Yankee and Zulu Ramps to the Density List. The Air Force would not pay the LOGCAP contractor to repair the construction deficiencies identified within the facilities, according to a 451<sup>st</sup> ECES official. The Air Force requested the USACE-TAD construction contractor to repair the facilities currently under warranty. However, the USACE-TAD

~~(FOUO)~~ construction contractor was slow to make repairs, according to a 451<sup>st</sup> ECES official. Consequently, Air Force personnel had to repair some of the construction deficiencies.

For example, on December 24, 2012, one facility had two doors that were off their hinges. The USACE-TAD construction contractor previously repaired the two doors, but they required additional repairs. In an undated performance evaluation of the construction contractor at 98 percent completion, the USACE resident engineer wrote that the contractor did not immediately correct deficient work after it was identified by USACE personnel.

Later on January 4, 2013, a 451<sup>st</sup> ECES official stated that facilities were not up to the LOGCAP contractor's standards for placement on the Density List. The doors of one facility we visited were off their hinges (see Figure 6) and its latrines did not work because of a broken water line. On a subsequent walkthrough on January 25, 2013, we identified two other facilities with several doors that had broken hinges. When we performed the walkthroughs, the facilities were about a year old, according to a 451<sup>st</sup> ECES official.



### ***Yankee and Zulu Ramps' Fire Suppression System Was Inoperable***

~~(FOUO)~~ The fire suppression system for Yankee and Zulu Ramps facilities was inoperable. On May 9, 2012, USACE-TAD accepted the water pump station for the fire suppression system (valued at \$417,458) from the construction contractor. However, on July 7, 2012, the LOGCAP contractor performed a second technical inspection and noted that the facilities on the Yankee and Zulu Ramps did not have any of the previously identified construction deficiencies corrected.<sup>11</sup> LOGCAP contractor personnel noted that they did not recommend conducting any flow testing or system testing until the entire system was evaluated and repaired, from the pump house to the hangars, isolating one portion of the infrastructure at a time. Furthermore, the LOGCAP contractor stated that flow testing or system testing prior to an entire system evaluation could result in injuries to personnel; damages to the current infrastructure to the point it would have to be replaced rather

<sup>11</sup> On June 8, 2012, the LOGCAP contractor performed a technical inspection on one Yankee Ramp facility and identified numerous problems with the fire detection and suppression systems.

(FOUO) than repaired; or more uncommanded activations<sup>12</sup> that could damage aircraft or support equipment. The Air Force requested that the USACE-TAD construction contractor fix the fire suppression system. If the USACE-TAD construction contractor does not fix the fire suppression system, USFOR-A should expedite repairs to the fire suppression system at the Yankee and Zulu Ramp facilities.

(FOUO) According to a 451<sup>st</sup> ECES official, as of January 25, 2013, all fire hydrants and the fire suppression system were shut down in the Yankee and Zulu Ramps. Specifically, the diesel pump in the pump house was turned off due to fire alarm testing in five hangars; therefore, the fire department would have been unable to use the fire hydrants in the event of a fire, as they would not have had enough water pressure, according to the 451<sup>st</sup> ECES official. See Figure 7 for the Yankee and Zulu Ramps operational (green line) and nonoperational (red line) fire suppression system. The red water supply lines had been isolated and were not pressurized at Zulu Ramp. Therefore, five facilities at Zulu Ramp did not have fire suppression capabilities. Nine fire hydrants on Zulu Ramp and one fire hydrant on Yankee Ramp were also not operational. Unified Facilities Criteria 3-600-01, Section 6-16.2, states that the minimum separation between tension fabric hangars and all other structures will be 100 feet with a clear zone of 50 feet immediately adjacent to the tension fabric structure. Without an operational fire suppression system, there was an increased risk that a fire within one of the hangars could spread to multiple hangars because the Yankee Ramp facilities were located approximately 10 feet from one another. During the audit, the Air Force informed us that it was aware of these fire safety concerns, and have requested that the USACE-TAD construction contractor fix the fire suppression system.



<sup>12</sup> An uncommanded activation means the fire suppression system malfunctioned, which caused the fire suppression to trigger.

## Improved Oversight Needed for Transitioning Facilities to the Density List

DoD Components at KAF lacked effective leadership to improve their oversight of transitioning facilities to the Density List. Specifically, USACE-TAD did not hold the construction contractors accountable, as required by contract, for performance that did not meet the required acceptable standards of quality. Additionally, there was a lack of coordination among multiple organizations that held no official ultimately responsible for transitioning facilities to the Density List at KAF.

### ***Contractors Did Not Construct Facilities to Acceptable Standards of Quality***

USACE-TAD did not hold the construction contractors accountable, as required by their respective construction contracts, for building facilities that did not meet acceptable standards of quality. On December 17, 2012, the Commander, 652<sup>nd</sup> RSG, stated he had concerns that USACE-TAD personnel were not adequately overseeing their construction contractors. Additionally, the Director, TF POWER, stated there was a problem with the quality of construction across Afghanistan. The director also stated that USACE-TAD personnel were feeling pressure for their schedule to be timely, and it caused the buildings to be constructed below acceptable standards of quality. Officials from the 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Division and the 451<sup>st</sup> ECES stated that the USACE-TAD construction contractors were not building facilities to acceptable standards of quality.

We reviewed the USACE-TAD quality assurance documentation for the facilities reviewed and identified that USACE-TAD personnel were not holding construction contractors accountable for their unsatisfactory performance. For example, the USACE-TAD quality assurance documents for original construction of the RSOI facilities identified that the construction contractor used unskilled labor and substandard material, were slow to correct deficiencies, and did not provide proper on-site management.

Additionally, the Command Central facility had 120 deficiencies identified in the USACE-TAD quality assurance documents. USACE-TAD quality assurance documents for construction of the Command Central facility identified that the construction contractor used unskilled labor, did not have enough resources, and would deviate from the approved design of the facility. USACE-TAD construction contractors were not held accountable for poorly constructing the Command Central facility and RSOI facilities.

### ***DoD Components Lacked Effective Coordination to Transition Facilities to the Density List***

There were several DoD components involved in transitioning facilities from the construction phase to the Density List for long-term sustainment: USACE-TAD, DCMA, U.S. Army Sustainment Command; Army Contracting Command-Rock Island, TF POWER; and the RSG at KAF. However, as of July 2013, an effective coordination mechanism does not exist for those organizations at KAF to verify that constructed facilities were properly transitioned to the Density List for long-term maintenance. In addition, no written regulation existed to provide guidance on roles and responsibilities for the transition of facilities from construction to the Density List. Commands responsible for the construction and maintenance of facilities need to work together to develop a more effective holistic process for property management, instead of independent segments. The Commander, USFOR-A, with representatives from USACE-TAD, DCMA, U.S. Army Sustainment Command, Army Contracting Command-Rock Island, TF POWER, and the RSG at KAF should establish a working group to oversee the transition of newly constructed or remodeled facilities to the Density List in a timely manner. Specifically, the working group should develop: a written process to verify facilities are constructed to acceptable standards of quality; measurable goals for facilities to be completed and transitioned to the Density List; and coordinate with the applicable contracting officer to modify the LOGCAP IV contract to require the tracking and reporting of cost per facility to bring the facilities up to acceptable standards of quality.

These organizations are not in the same direct chain of command, nor do they report to the same local leadership. This organizational alignment did not have a position for an official that would be held ultimately responsible for transitioning facilities to the Density List at KAF. Therefore, the Commander, USFOR-A, should assign a general officer to chair the working group. The assigned general officer would be the senior military officer who provides the necessary leadership to effectively lead the working group to facilitate the various commands to work together to transition of facilities to the Density List.

### **DoD Did Not Effectively Sustain Facilities**

DoD constructed facilities that the RSG was not able to effectively sustain. DoD paid the LOGCAP contractor millions of dollars to repair the facilities either before or shortly after the facilities were added to the Density List, and 19 of the 23 facilities that cost DoD \$43.1 million were either not used or USACE: (b) (5) of quality. Additionally, the fire suppression systems in 21 of the 23 facilities would not adequately suppress a fire, putting the life and safety of the occupants in jeopardy.

## Management Comments on the Finding and Our Response

### ***Management Comments on USACE-TAD Construction Quality and Responsibility for Corrected Deficiencies***

The Deputy Commander, USACE-TAD, stated that he does not agree that all work performed by the LOGCAP contractor prior to adding facilities to the Density List was due to poor construction and that contractors were not held accountable. He stated that U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) construction does generally meet quality standards contained in contract specifications and in the instances where contract specifications are not met, they will seek to hold contractors accountable to the extent allowed by the contract. Furthermore, the deputy commander stated that they have been collaborating with the LOGCAP contractor to ensure early input by the LOGCAP contractor's team and that this collaboration includes joint inspections with representatives from USACE and the LOGCAP contractor. The deputy commander believed that as the joint inspection process improved, the quality of facilities turned over to the user would improve and result in more expeditious acceptance on to the Density List.

The deputy commander stated that USACE believes that many of the deficiencies and issues discussed in report were caused by the occupants who occupied the facilities prior to the facilities placement on a maintenance contract, lack of maintenance for long periods of time, and improper repairs made by occupants or maintenance contractors that void original construction warranties. For example, the deputy commander believed that many of the repairs required at the RSOI facilities were likely due to lack of routine maintenance and not initial construction deficiencies. Also, the deputy commander stated that for the Command Central facility, the maintenance contractor overcharged the systems causing damage to the compressors and voiding the construction contract warranty.

### ***Our Response***

We commend USACE-TAD for working with the LOGCAP contractor on joint inspections of the facilities; however, we disagree on the quality of the construction by USACE-TAD contractors and that the contractors were being held accountable. For the facilities reviewed, USACE-TAD quality assurance documentation showed that USACE-TAD construction contractors had several USACE: (b) (5) performance ratings. Additionally, the facilities were poorly constructed by the USACE-TAD construction contractors, according to interviews with the Director, TF POWER; Commander, 652<sup>nd</sup> RSG at KAF; Commander, 452<sup>nd</sup> ECES; the 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Division, Engineering

staff and HQ Battalion staff; DCMA-Southern Afghanistan officials; and U.S. Army Sustainment Command officials.

We disagree with the deputy commander that many of the deficiencies and issues discussed in the report were caused by the occupants of the facilities prior to the facilities placement on a maintenance contract, lack of maintenance for long periods of time, and improper repairs made by occupants or maintenance contractors that void original construction warranties. For the RSOI facilities, in June 2012, TF POWER reviewed the entire facility's electrical system and found the external feeder cables, interior wiring, electrical panels, raceways, and electrical devices consisted of nonlisted materials—there was no evidence to suggest this was caused by lack of maintenance or the occupants. For the Command Central facility's HVAC system, we do not have sufficient evidence to determine whether the LOGCAP contractor damaged the compressors. However, the USACE-TAD quality assurance documents for construction of the Command Central facility identified that the construction contractor used unskilled labor, did not have enough resources, and would deviate from the approved design of the facility. Also, on December 24, 2012, we interviewed engineering and property management officials from the 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Division and they stated that the HVAC unit installed by the USACE-TAD construction contractor was poor quality and it did not have enough compressors. Also, they stated that the LOGCAP contractor frequently conducts repairs to the facility because it was poorly constructed.

## Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

### ***Redirected Recommendation***


As a result of management comments, we redirected Recommendation 2 to the Commander, USFOR-A, which the Deputy Director of USCENTCOM Logistics/Engineering stated is the proper command level authority in order to influence expedited repairs of U.S. facilities.

### ***Recommendation 1***

USCENTCOM: (b) (5)



USCENTCOM: (b) (5)

***Commander, United States Forces-Afghanistan Comments***

The Commanding General, U.S. National Support Element Command-Afghanistan, responded for the Commander, USFOR-A, USCENTCOM: (b) (5)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

***Our Response***

USCENTCOM: (b) (5)

[Redacted]

***Recommendation 2***

USCENTCOM: (b) (5)

[Redacted]

### ***Commander, United States Central Command Comments***

USCENTCOM: (b) (5)

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### ***Our Response***

USCENTCOM: (b) (5)

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### ***Recommendation 3***

We recommend that the Commander, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Transatlantic Division, review the actions of the official(s) who conducted contract oversight and approved the inoperative fire suppression system and fire detection system at the:

- a. Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration facilities at Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan; and, as appropriate, initiate corrective measures and actions to hold personnel accountable.
- b. Command Central facility at Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan; and as appropriate, initiate corrective measures and actions to hold personnel accountable.

### ***Commander, United States Army Corps of Engineers, Transatlantic Division Comments***

The deputy commander, responding for the Commander, USACE-TAD, agreed stating that USACE will conduct an additional review of the circumstances that have allowed fire suppression and detection systems to remain nonoperational and will take actions deemed appropriate based on the outcome of the review. The target completion date is December 31, 2013.

### ***Our Response***

Comments from the deputy commander were responsive and no additional comments are required.

***Recommendation 4***

We recommend that the Commander, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Transatlantic Division, for the Expeditionary Airlift Shelter and Cargo Handling Warehouse:

- a. Hold the contractor accountable for the not constructing the facilities to acceptable standards of quality.
- b. Require the contractor to bring the facilities up to acceptable standards of quality, in order to add the facilities to the Density List.

***Commander, United States Army Corps of Engineers,  
Transatlantic Division Comments***

The deputy commander, responding for the Commander, USACE-TAD, agreed stating that USACE is taking action to hold the construction contractor accountable and USACE will work with the user and LOGCAP contractor to add the facilities to the Density List. The target completion date is December 31, 2013.

***Our Response***

Comments from the deputy commander were responsive and no additional comments are required.

## Appendix

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### Scope and Methodology

We conducted this performance audit from November 2012 through July 2013 at KAF, Afghanistan, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective.

We examined facilities on the Density List to determine the repair costs they incurred before they were added to the list. Additionally, we examined facilities at KAF that were not on the Density List to determine what prevented their placement on the list. We interviewed officials from USCENTCOM, USFOR-A, DCMA, Defense Contract Audit Agency, USACE, the Joint Staff, DynCorp International, 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Division, 652<sup>nd</sup> RSG, LOGCAP Liaison Support Office, and 451<sup>st</sup> ECES. We conducted site visits at the Cargo Handling Warehouse, Expeditionary Airlift Shelter, Command Central facility, RSOI facilities, and Yankee and Zulu Ramps.

We reviewed USACE-TAD quality assurance reports, the LOGCAP contractor's technical inspections, contracts and contract modifications for the facilities reviewed, and various documents that pertain to the facilities we reviewed. We reviewed DoD Instruction 6055.06, "DoD Fire and Emergency Services (F&ES) Program," December 21, 2006; USCENTCOM Regulation 415-1, "Construction and Base Camp Development in the USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility," October 17, 2011; Unified Facilities Criteria 3-600-01, "Fire Protection Engineering For Facilities," September 26, 2006; and a USFOR-A Policy Memorandum granting the Director of TF POWER waiver authority for electrical deficiencies.

We reviewed contract number W52P1J-07-D-0007, Task Order 0004, awarded by Rock Island Contracting Center for the U.S. Army Sustainment Command to DynCorp International, headquartered in Falls Church, Virginia, on July 7, 2009, a cost-plus-award-fee contract, valued at \$5.4 billion, as of April 10, 2013. Additionally, we reviewed the modifications to this contract. This contract was for LOGCAP IV services in southern Afghanistan. We reviewed the LOGCAP contractor's performance work statement dealing with facilities management to determine the LOGCAP contractor's responsibilities as it pertained to the transition of facilities to the Density List.

We nonstatistically selected 4 contracts that resulted in the construction of 23 facilities, valued at \$67.5 million, at KAF. Specifically, we selected the following contracts:

1. Contract Number W917PM-09-C-0016; RSOI facilities (3 facilities); valued at \$12.1 million;<sup>13</sup>
2. Contract Number W912ER-09-C-0037; Command Central (1 facility); valued at \$12.3 million;
3. Contract Number W912ER-11-C-0017; Cargo Handling Warehouse and Expeditionary Airlift Shelter (2 facilities); valued at \$13.0 million; and
4. Contract Number W912ER-10-C-0050; Zulu and Yankee Ramps (17 facilities); valued at \$30.1 million.

We selected the Cargo Handling Warehouse, Expeditionary Airlift Shelter, and Yankee and Zulu Ramps based on the recommendations by the commanders from 652<sup>nd</sup> RSG and 451<sup>st</sup> ECES. The commanders were USACE: (b) (5) [REDACTED] that prevented their addition to the Density List. We selected the Command Central facility because it was a key structure at KAF and it received repairs shortly after its addition to the Density List. Additionally, we selected the RSOI facilities because they received repairs before they were added to the Density List.

## Use of Computer-Processed Data

We did not use computer-processed data to perform this audit.

## Use of Technical Assistance

DoD OIG Quantitative Methods Division analysts and Technical Assessment Directorate engineers assisted with the audit. The quantitative methods analysts assisted in nonstatistically selecting the four contracts reviewed in the audit. The technical assessment engineers performed fire protection inspections at the Command Central facility, the RSOI facilities, and the facilities at the Yankee Ramps during 2012.

## Prior Coverage

No prior coverage has been conducted on the transition of facilities to the Density List at KAF during the last 5 years.

<sup>13</sup> Contract W917PM-09-C-0016 contained two additional facilities (five total), that increased the total monetary value of the contract to \$27.3 million; however, we only reviewed the RSOI portion of the contract valued at \$12.1 million.

## Management Comments

### United States Central Command



UNCLASSIFIED  
UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND  
1115 SOUTH BOUNDARY BOULEVARD  
MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 33621-3101

08 August 2013

TO: Inspector General, Department of Defense, 4800 Mark Center Drive, Alexandria, Virginia 22350-1500

SUBJECT: CENTCOM Response to DODIG Draft report Project No. D2013-D000JB-0050.000: "DOD is Not Properly Monitoring the Initiation of Maintenance for Facilities at Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan"

USCENTCOM: (b) (5)



4. Point of contact [REDACTED]

  
SCOTT M. ANDERSON, SES  
Deputy Director of Logistics/Engineering

UNCLASSIFIED

### Final Report Reference

Recommendation  
was redirected to  
Commander, United  
States Forces-  
Afghanistan.

## United States Forces-Afghanistan

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~ [REDACTED]

HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES FORCES-AFGHANISTAN  
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN  
APO, AE 09356


USNSEC-A CG

13 August 2013

MEMORANDUM FOR Office of the Department of Defense – Inspector General  
4800 Mark Center Drive, Alexandria, VA 22350-1500

SUBJECT: USFOR-A Response to DOD IG Draft Report – “DoD Is Not Properly Monitoring  
the Initiation of Maintenance for Facilities at Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan (Project No.  
D2013-D000JB-0050,000)”

USCENTCOM: (b) (5)

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~ [REDACTED]


## United States Forces-Afghanistan (cont'd)

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~ [REDACTED]

USFOR-A CDR

SUBJECT: USFOR-A Response to Draft Report - "DoD Is Not Properly Monitoring the Initiation of Maintenance for Facilities at Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan (Project No. D2013-D000JB-0050.000)."

3. Please direct any questions [REDACTED]



JAMES M. RICHARDSON  
Major General, U.S. Army  
Commanding General  
United States National Support Element-Command  
Afghanistan

***Distribution:***

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics  
Commander, U.S. Central Command  
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management and Comptroller)  
Director, Defense Contract Audit Agency  
Director, Defense Contract Management Agency  
Director, Joint Staff  
Naval Inspector General  
Auditor General, Department of the Army

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~ [REDACTED]

## United States Army Corps of Engineers

REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS  
TRANSATLANTIC DIVISION  
251 FORT COLLIER ROAD  
WINCHESTER, VIRGINIA 22603-5774

**12 AUG 2013**

CETAD-IR

MEMORANDUM FOR Inspector General Department of Defense (DoDIG)  
ATTN: Amy J. Frontz, Principal Assistant Inspector General for Auditing, 4800 Mark Center  
Drive, Alexandria, Virginia 22350-1500

SUBJECT: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) Response to DoDIG Draft Report, DoD Is  
Not Properly Monitoring The Initiation of Maintenance for Facilities at Kandahar Airfield,  
Afghanistan, (Project No. D2013-D000JB-0050.00)

1. Enclosed is USACE Transatlantic Division response to DoDIG Draft Report, DoD Is Not  
Properly Monitoring the Initiation of Maintenance for Facilities at Kandahar Airfield,  
Afghanistan, (Project No. D2013-D000JB-0050.00).

2. My point of contact for these comments [REDACTED]

DoD OIG: (b) (6)

Encl

## United States Army Corps of Engineers (cont'd)

USACE Comments for DoDIG Draft Report, DoD Is Not Properly Monitoring The Initiation of Maintenance for Facilities at Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan, (Project No. D2013-D0001B-0050,00)

USACE comments are provided for the draft report and each recommendation as shown.

**USACE General Comments on Draft Report:** Throughout the report DoDIG implies that the work performed by the LOGCAP contractor before adding facilities to the density list was due to poor construction; that USACE construction did not meet quality standards; and that contractors are not being held accountable.

USACE does not agree that all work performed by the LOGCAP contractor prior to adding facilities to the density list was due to construction deficiencies. USACE construction does generally meet quality standards contained in contract specifications. In those instances where contract specifications are not met USACE will seek to hold contractors accountable to the extent allowed by the contract.

USACE agrees that many of the deficiencies discussed in DoDIG's report, such as fire suppression issues warrant immediate action to correct. USACE also agrees that facilities should be added to the Density List as soon as possible to ensure that routine maintenance is performed and that minor routine repairs do not become major problems. USACE has been collaborating with the LOGCAP contractor to ensure early input by the LOGCAP contractor's team. This collaboration includes joint inspections with representatives from USACE and the LOGCAP contractor. USACE believes that as the joint inspection process improves, the quality of facilities turned over to the user will improve, and will result in more expeditious acceptance on to the Density List. However, USACE believes that many of the deficiencies and issues discussed in DoDIG's report were caused by the occupants who occupied the facilities prior to the facilities being placed on a maintenance contract (no mechanism in place to ensure that routine upkeep repairs are made before becoming major problems), lack of maintenance for long periods of time and improper repairs made by occupants or maintenance contractors that void original construction warranties. As stated above, USACE has been implementing a joint phased inspection process in collaboration with the LOGCAP contractor. USACE will continue to work with the LOGCAP contractor to improve the joint inspection process.

**USACE Comments, Draft Report Page 7 and 8, "Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration Facilities Were Poorly Constructed Before They Were Added to the Density List":** The DoDIG draft report states "In 2012, the RSOI facilities, which cost about \$12.1 million to construct, required repairs that cost an estimated \$5.6 million, or 46 percent of construction cost before they could be added to the Density List." While this statement suggests that \$5.6M in repair was required, a USACE Memorandum for Record, dated 15 September 2011, indicates that the buildings were accepted and occupied by the user in 2009 and 2010, with no maintenance contract in place. For example, RSOI Building # 3 was accepted and occupied by the user in August 2009 and Buildings 1 and 2 in May 2010. These facilities were occupied by the user for over 20 months without a maintenance contract in place. In January 2012 DCMA directed the LOGCAP contractor to repair all plumbing, electrical, and HVAC deficiencies so that RSOI facilities could be added to the density list. Considering that the facilities were being used for over 20 months without a maintenance contract, USACE believes that many of the repairs required at the RSOI facilities were likely due to lack of routine maintenance and not initial construction deficiencies. Additionally, as discussed on page 8 of DoDIG's report the LOGCAP contractor was unable to provide individual vouchers showing the costs billed for repair work on the RSOI facility.

**USACE Comments Draft Report Pages 11 and 12 "Command Central Facility Had Multiple Construction Problems":** DoDIG's draft report mentions several times that the USACE-TAD construction contractor did not repair HVAC units in the Command Central Facility. This statement is true, but if the user/O&M

## United States Army Corps of Engineers (cont'd)

USACE Comments for DoDIG Draft Report, DoD Is Not Properly Monitoring The Initiation of Maintenance for Facilities at Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan, (Project No. D2013-D000JB-0050.00)

provider violates the warranty and damages the system, the USACE contractor cannot be held liable for their mistake. For this particular incident, the O&M contractor overcharged the systems causing damage to the compressors and voiding the construction contract warranty.

USACE believes that improved collaboration and joint acceptance inspections involving the customer, the LOGCAP contractor, and USACE will result in a coordinated turnover of the facility to the customer and more timely addition of the facility to the Density List.

**USACE Comments Draft Report pages 15 and 16 "Expeditionary Airlift Shelter Was Not Added to the Density List":** A windstorm on 8 April 2013, during the projected week of turnover, damaged this structure. The contractor is currently scheduled to complete the repairs by mid-August 2013.

As of 26 July 2013, all but two of the deficiencies previously identified by the LOGCAP contractor have been corrected by the construction contractor. USACE is working with the end user to transition this facility to the Density List. USACE has held the contractor accountable for producing a quality product that meets contract requirements.

USACE continues to monitor the construction contractor's progress and correction of deficiencies. USACE is holding retainage of almost \$800,000 and has sent multiple letters of concern. The contractor's performance issues on this contract will be appropriately addressed in their performance evaluations.

**USACE Comments Draft Report pages 16, "Cargo Handling Warehouse Was Not Added to the Density List":** The Cargo Handling Hardstand was turned over incrementally in May and November of 2012. Portions of the Cargo Handling Warehouse were turned over on 4 February 2013 and the rest of the facility was turned over on 20 April 2013. The final inspection conducted on 19 April 2013 yielded no deficiencies. The LOGCAP contract inspector verified that the previous deficiencies had been corrected and verbally told the project engineer, quality assurance representative, electrical technician, the contractor and representative from the user that all of the previous deficiencies had been corrected. The 451st ECES commander signed for the facility with the understanding that it was added to the Density List.

**USACE Comments, Draft Report pages 17, 18 and 19, "Facilities on the Yankee and Zulu Ramps Needed Repairs":** USACE personnel are involved in the warranty issues and the repair of the fire suppression systems on this contract. Five of the hangers were not accepted due to inoperable fire suppression systems. The contractor did correct this and the user has accepted these facilities. USACE did send a serial letter to the contractor requiring them to repair all the door hinges on this contract. The contractor replaced all damaged doors and plans to supply replacement hinges for all remaining doors. The contractor has ordered 62 additional fabricated hinges.

**USACE Comments Draft Report Pages 9 and 10 Reference Fire Suppression and Detection Systems Inspections:** The inspection performed by the KAF Fire Department Inspector refers to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) standard 5000 requiring that each building is to have a separate zone. USACE will work with the KAF Fire Department to identify the corrections necessary.

**USACE Comment Draft Report Page 13 Reference Fire Suppression and Detection Systems Inspections:** The inspection of the Command Central facility, performed by the LOGCAP contractor fire inspectors on June 27, 2012 indicates that the inspectors concluded the facility did not have enough smoke detectors.

## United States Army Corps of Engineers (cont'd)

USACE Comments for DoDIG Draft Report, DoD Is Not Properly Monitoring The Initiation of Maintenance for Facilities at Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan, (Project No. D2013-D000JB-0050.00)

No specific code, chapter, or section is listed defining what is "enough detectors." USACE will follow-up with the LOGCAP contractor to identify the specific code reference, compare the code requirements with those specified in the contract, and will take remedial action as appropriate.

**USACE Comments Draft Report Page 18 Reference the Yankee and Zulu Ramps' Fire Suppression System Being Inoperable:** The problems at these ISR Hangars are well documented in deficiency punch lists. USACE fire subject matter experts have inspected the facilities and concluded that underground leaks are the primary cause of problems associated with fire pumps. This was based on pressurizing isolated sections of pipe.

**DoDIG Draft Report Recommendation 3:** We recommend that the Commander, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers-Transatlantic Division, review the actions of the official(s) who:

- a. Conducted contract oversight and approved the inoperative fire suppression system and fire detection system at the Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration facilities at Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan; and, as appropriate, initiate corrective measures and actions to hold personnel accountable.
- b. Conducted contract oversight and approved the inoperative fire suppression and fire detection system at the Command Central facility at Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan; and as appropriate initiate corrective measures and actions to hold personnel accountable.

**USACE Comments, Draft Report Recommendation 3:** Concur - USACE will conduct an additional review of the circumstances that have allowed fire suppression and detection systems to remain nonoperational and will take actions deemed appropriate based on the outcome of the review. Target date for completing the review is 31 December 2013.

**DoDIG Draft Report Recommendation 4:** We recommend that the Commander, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers-Transatlantic Division, for the Expeditionary Airlift Shelter and Cargo Handling Warehouse:

- a. Hold the contractor accountable for the not constructing the facilities to acceptable standards of quality.
- b. Require the contractor to bring the facilities up to acceptable standards of quality, in order to add the facilities to the Density list.

**USACE Comments, Draft Report Recommendation 4:** Concur - USACE is taking action to hold the contractor accountable for quality standards per contract specifications and requirements. As discussed above in USACE comments concerning the Expeditionary Airlift Shelter, as of 26 July 2013, all but two of the deficiencies identified by the LOGCAP contractor at the Expeditionary Airlift Shelter have been corrected by the construction contractor. USACE is working with the end user to transition this facility to the density list. USACE has held the contractor accountable for producing a quality product that meets contract requirements. USACE continues to monitor the construction contractor's progress and correction of deficiencies. USACE is holding retainage of almost \$800,000 and has sent multiple letters of concern. The contractor's performance issues on this contract will be appropriately addressed in their performance evaluations and the contractor will be held accountable for any deficiencies to the extent allowed by the contract. Target completion date is 31 December 2013.

## United States Army Corps of Engineers (cont'd)

USACE Comments for DoDIG Draft Report, DoD Is Not Properly Monitoring The Initiation of Maintenance for Facilities at Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan, (Project No. D2013-D000JB-0050.00)

The Cargo Handling Warehouse has already been turned over to the user incrementally beginning in 2009. USACE will work with USFOR-A, the user, and the LOGCAP contractor to ensure that deficiencies are corrected, and the facilities are added to the Density List. USACE will also hold the construction contractor responsible to the extent allowed by the contract. Target completion date is 31 December 2013.

Page 4 of 4

## Acronyms and Abbreviations

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<b>DCMA</b>	Defense Contract Management Agency
<b>ECES</b>	Expeditionary Civil Engineer Squadron
<b>HVAC</b>	Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning
<b>KAF</b>	Kandahar Airfield
<b>LOGCAP</b>	Logistics Civil Augmentation Program
<b>NFPA</b>	National Fire Protection Association
<b>RSG</b>	Regional Support Group
<b>RSOI</b>	Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration
<b>TF POWER</b>	Task Force Protect Our Warfighter and Electrical Resources
<b>USACE</b>	U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
<b>USACE-TAD</b>	U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Transatlantic Division
<b>USCENTCOM</b>	U.S. Central Command
<b>USFOR-A</b>	U.S. Forces-Afghanistan



# **Whistleblower Protection**

## **U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**

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